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Introduction 
When the British anthropologist Sir James Frazer (1854–1941) set out to study the cult 
of Diana of Aricia, the Roman goddess of the hunt, he eventually ended up with a continuum 
theory of thinking. He supposed that ways of thinking had developed from magic, through 
religion, to science over the course of human history. He also wondered whether this kind of 
development would continue in the future and concluded that "we cannot tell" (Frazer, 
1922/1963, p.827). 
Now, after a century, we know the answer. Scientific education has not eliminated 
supernatural beliefs. In the country with the world's best universities, the United States, there 
are far more astrologers than astronomers (Gilovich, 1991). In Finland, whose education 
system has been rated as one of the best in the world, nearly half of the population thinks that 
angels exist and that death may not be final (The Church Research Institute, 2016). The 
question of why well-educated individuals still believe in the supernatural is intriguing. Why 
does the supernatural still captivate even though an exciting and more realistic scientific 
worldview is available?  
 Many scientists have been interested in paranormal beliefs, and their multifaceted 
manifestations, explanations and correlates have received much research attention. Good 
reviews of the studies in this area are available to the interested reader (e.g., Bering, 2011; 
Hood, 2009; Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 2014). Books for a wider audience are also worthy of 
attention (e.g., Hutson, 2012; Shermer, 2011). These works discuss several issues that are not 
addressed in the present review, including biological and demographic variables and the 
impact of threat, personality, education and social environment on beliefs.  
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The focus of the present chapter is in themes that have not been explored in depth in 
previous work. Due to the advancements in dual-process theories of higher cognition and 
domain-specific cognition, the research focus of the research has expanded to analytical and 
intuitive thinking, and to the content of beliefs. Because the number of such studies has 
rapidly increased in recent years and has offered new insight, my aim here is to review and 
discuss paranormal beliefs in terms of these lines of research.   
For purposes of simplicity, I will sometimes speak here about believers vs. skeptics, 
although believing is obviously a non-dichotomic phenomenon.  Several concepts have been 
in use to describe the same type of beliefs. Despite their different etymologies, the concepts 
‘paranormal,’  ‘magical,’ ‘superstitious’ and ‘supernatural’ have been shown to mean the 
same thing (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012) so I will use the terms interchangeably. The 
concept of ‘religious’ is slightly different. Although belief in the supernatural is the key 
defining attribute of religiosity, religions also bring with them non-supernatural doctrines, 
rituals, art and politics, as well as social, moral and emotional aspects, whereas nothing 
comparable exists with other supernatural beliefs. 
I begin negligently, without defining the beliefs, because it has turned out to be a 
difficult task.  Initially, superstitious, paranormal, supernatural and magical beliefs were seen 
simply as mistakes. This definition is unusable, because in that case, the belief that New York 
is a city in Texas should be classified as a superstition. Defining beliefs as that which violate 
the fundamental and scientifically founded principles of nature does not help, either. The 
belief that color is an attribute of a material object contradicts the laws of physics, but it is not 
a paranormal belief (color is an interpretation that our brain makes about light energy).  
 Although defining paranormal beliefs has been difficult, the difference between them 
and other beliefs is intuitively easy to detect. For some reason, everyone knows that believing 
in ghosts is quite different from an incorrect conception of color. Some scholars even defined 
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the paranormal as phenomena that most members of society would recognize as falling into 
this category (Campbell, 1996). However, the reason why identification is easy, did not 
attract attention. 
Paranormal Beliefs and Dual-Process Theories of Reasoning 
The idea that human thinking is not a singular system is not new. The notion of diverse 
thinking systems has gone through different variations over the centuries, including the 
ancient Greek philosophers' distinctions between the rational soul and other souls, and the 
French scientist Blaise Pascal's (1623–1662) timeless quote” The heart has its reasons, which 
reason does not know".  Perhaps closest to the present perspective was the English 
philosopher, William of Ockham (1287–1347), who distinguished reason from faith, and 
stated radically that scientific explanations should be made without references to the 
supernatural because the supernatural is simply a question of faith.  
Kahneman and Tversky's Nobel Prize-winning work on heuristic decision making 
(Kahneman, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), and increased knowledge about the human 
mind and its evolutionary origins overall, has greatly advanced our understanding of dual 
processing in higher cognition. In recent times, dual-process theories have been proposed in 
several fields of psychology, including social, developmental, personality and cognitive 
psychology, as well as cognitive neuroscience (Evans & Stanovich, 2009; Evans, 2008). Two 
dual-process theories, in particular, have been applied to research on paranormal beliefs. Here 
I refer to them as the Epsteinian approach and the process approach.  
The Epsteinian Approach  
Cognitive-experiential self-theory. One of the most popular theories of the two ways 
of knowing is Epstein's cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST), a combined theory of 
cognition and personality (Epstein, 2010; Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Pacini & Epstein, 1999). 
According to CEST, humans operate with two information-processing systems that have 
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different operating rules: the experiential system, also known as the intuitive system, and the 
rational system, also known as the analytical system.  The experiential and the rational 
systems are proposed to operate synchronously under most circumstances, wherein people are 
only aware of what appears to them to be a single process. However, under other 
circumstances, as in conflicts between 'reason' and 'the heart,' the different qualities of the 
two thinking systems become apparent. 
The experiential system is assumed to be an evolutionarily old, primarily nonverbal, 
and automatically operating cognitive system. According to CEST, experiential/intuitive 
information processing is holistic, associative and concrete. It is based primarily on 
experiences: Namely, experiences – either direct or vicarious – are the only reality in the 
system. The experiential system encompasses all phenomena that are based on non-analytical 
information processing, for instance irrational fears and superstitions, and especially all kinds 
of intuitions. In CEST, an intuition is aptly defined as a sense of knowing without knowing 
how one knows. 
Rational/analytical processes, in turn, are described as evolutionarily recent, mostly 
conscious, and affect-free verbal processes that result in explicit, deliberative knowledge. 
Concepts of truth and reality are based on logical considerations and evidence, rather than 
personal experiences. Whereas intuitive processes help us to learn from experience, and 
behave automatically and effectively with minimal cognitive effort, analytical processes can 
operate at higher levels of abstraction, can correct intuitive biases as well as enable the 
transmitting of information and the progression of knowledge.  
 CEST helps us to understand paranormal beliefs in two ways. First, early empirical 
findings on paranormal believers' ways of thinking and the co-existence of two conflicting 
beliefs, all thus far conducted along separate lines of research, can be incorporated into one 
framework. Second, several studies on paranormal beliefs have used the Rational-
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Experiential Inventory and have provided important information about believers' and 
skeptics' thinking styles.  
Early empirical work. According to CEST, superstitious thinking has the same 
attributes as intuitive thinking in general (Epstein, 2010). Of these attributes, associative and 
holistic thinking in particular have received much research attention, and the findings have 
been unambiguous. Although not based on CEST, a host of studies have shown that more 
than nonbelievers, believers connect two or more things liberally together in their minds, 
resulting in impressions of causality, contagion and covariation (reviews: Rozin & Nemeroff, 
2002; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). For example, believers rate randomly paired words (e.g., 
elephant-banana) as being more closely and meaningfully related than do skeptics (Mohr, 
Graves, Gianotti, Pizzagalli, & Brugger, 2001).   
Moreover, many scholars have mentioned that a special sense of holism – an extreme 
form of outspread associations – characterizes superstitious and magical thinking. This 
feeling has been described as a sense of global totality, undivided unity, an interconnected 
cosmos and a fundamental relation between a human being and the universe (Malinowski, 
1948/1992; Piaget, 1929/1951). In support of these ideas, one study showed that, whereas 
other participants accepted the existence of chance and randomness in the universe, members 
of a New Age (spiritualist) community believed in a fully determined universe and the unity 
between self and events in the outside world: "It's not outside, it's all the same," as one 
interviewee said (see also Farias, Claridge, & Lalljee, 2005; Lesser & Marilyn, 1985, p. 68). 
CEST also emphasizes the conflict between intuitive and rational beliefs, an 
observation that has a long history in studies on paranormal beliefs. Decades ago, Mauss 
(1902/1972) wrote that in magic the individual does not reason, or if he does, this reasoning 
is unconscious.(Tylor, 1871/1974) argued that magic is felt and lived rather than thought. In 
the report on his ethnographic studies on the Trobriand Islands in New Guinea, Malinowski  
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(1948/1992) described his bafflement upon finding that people can have two so completely 
contradictory beliefs about one thing. He found, for example, that the Trobrianders believed 
that the spirit of the dead, Baloma, impregnates women if they bath in a lagoon and that 
becoming pregnant in other ways is not possible. At the same time, however, the 
Trobrianders knew that a man and a woman have to be together to make conception possible.  
A similar co-existence of supernatural and rational beliefs has been observed in 
contemporary studies, for example in beliefs about the nature of death (Astuti & Harris, 
2008), illness (Legare & Gelman, 2008) and biological processes (Lindeman & Saher, 2007). 
Subbotsky has obtained relevant evidence in many experiments. In one of his studies, adult 
participants believed in scientific explanations rather than in the experimenter's magic spells 
when asked verbally what had caused a piece of plastic to be badly scratched after it had been 
put in a box. When the participants were asked to put their hands in the box, however, they 
felt more anxious and requested the experimenter not to repeat the magic spell (Subbotsky, 
2001).  
Many things develop in the same way, by adding new material alongside old content. 
Our nervous system is hierarchically built, layered like a cake (Peters, 2013), and our body 
hair stands up when we are cold although we nowadays have more efficient shields against 
low temperatures. Similarly, studies on learning show that in many cases, science education 
does not replace intuitive misconceptions and that the misconceptions can coincide with 
rational knowledge (e.g., Reiner, Slotta, Chi, & Resnick, 2000; Shtulman & Harrington, 
2015).  
Nonetheless, paranormal beliefs are more paradoxical than many other beliefs:  people often 
know that their beliefs are irrational and unreasonable, and that the superstitious rituals they 
engage in do not work (Epstein & Pacini, 1999; Risen, 2016; Rozin & Nemeroff, 2002). 
Paranormal beliefs are thus unlike any other incorrect beliefs, as people typically do not 
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believe in the things they consider unbelievable or use expedients they consider to be 
unworkable.  
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI). One of the main arguments of CEST is that 
individuals differ in the degree to which they rely on experiential and rational information 
processing. Because assessment methods for individual differences were lacking, Epstein, 
Pacini, Denes Raj, and Heier (1996)) developed the Rational-Experiential Inventory. 
Nowadays, the original REI (Epstein et al., 1996) or its newer versions (Norris & Epstein, 
2011; Pacini & Epstein, 1999) constitute one of the most common methods in studies on the 
relationship between intuitive and analytical thinking and paranormal beliefs. 
The REI has two subscales. The Rationality subscale is based on the Need for 
Cognition scale (NfC, Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996) which assesses engagement 
in and enjoyment of effortful cognitive activity. The scale includes statements such as 'I enjoy 
problems that require hard thinking' and 'I prefer complex to simple problems.'  The concept 
of rationality in the subscale name is misleading because, as several scholars have mentioned, 
enjoying thinking does not imply rationality (Petty, Briñol, Loersch, & McCaslin, 2009; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013; Yates & Chandler, 2000). One can enjoy contemplating 
nonsense, after all. Therefore here I will use the original and well-established scale name, 
Need for Cognition.  
Items in the other subscale, Faith in Intuition (FI), were generated by Epstein and his 
colleagues to assess the extent to which individuals depend on gut feelings when making 
decisions and follow their heart as a guide for actions. Example items include ‘I like to rely 
on my intuitive impressions’ and 'I trust my initial feelings about people.' According to 
CEST, intuitive and analytical thinking styles are not opposites on one continuum but rather 
two independent dimensions. A person can thus be high or low in one or both styles. In 
support of this argument, several studies have shown a lack of correlation between NfC and 
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FI scores (e.g., Barr, Pennycook, Stolz, & Fugelsang, 2015; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, & 
Fugelsang, 2016; Pretz & Totz, 2007).  
Epstein et al. (1996) were the first to show that when superstitions increase, Need for 
Cognition decreases and Faith in Intuition increases. Most subsequent results have replicated 
these findings. The positive relationship between Faith in Intuition and paranormal beliefs 
has typically been strong, with correlations usually ranging from .35 to .50. The association 
between need for cognition and paranormal beliefs is negative but weaker, with correlations 
seldom reaching a value higher than -.25 (e.g., Aarnio & Lindeman, 2007; Epstein et al., 
1996; Lindeman & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 2016; Lobato, Mendoza, Sims, & Chin, 2014; 
Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013).  
As a whole, the studies demonstrate quite clearly that people who believe in 
supernatural phenomena do not enjoy intellectual challenges and prefer to follow their 
instincts and rely on their intuition. Cognitive motivation to analyze one's thinking and the 
available information, as measured by the Need for Cognition scale, seems to decrease the 
beliefs but the correlation is not very strong.   
The Process Approach  
‘Process approach’ refers here to Evans and Stanovich's model of Type 1 and Type 2  
processes, previously called System 1 and System 2 (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich, 
West, & Toplak, 2010).  Evans and Stanovich are dual-process scholars who first developed 
their theories independently but have recently integrated their work. This line of research 
differs from the Epsteinian approach in important respects. Evans (2009) has argued that 
researchers often confuse these two approaches. He writes that the two types of cognitive 
processes simply cannot be equated with such personality characteristics as intuitive and 
analytical thinking styles, and continues: "I fail to understand how systems and styles can be 
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combined (…) in this way" (p. 36). Although we have fallen into this confusion in our 
research group as well, it is easy to concur with this remark.  
According to this approach, Type 1 and Type 2 processes have only a few defining 
attributes. Type 1 processes are autonomous processes which do not require working memory 
or controlled attention whereas Type 2 processing rely heavily on working memory. Other 
attributes, such as those described by the Epsteinian approach, are regarded only as correlates 
of the two processes.  Examples of Type 1 processes include the behavioral regulation of 
emotions, evolutionary modules for solving adaptive problems, implicit learning processes 
and overlearned associations. Type 1 processes yield default responses unless higher-order, 
Type 2 reasoning processes do not intervene with these judgments and improve or correct 
them.  Type 2 thinking enables uniquely human facilities, such as hypothetical thinking, 
mental simulation and consequential decision making.  
Applying the process model to paranormal belief 
To understand the relationship between analytical thinking and paranormal beliefs, 
Stanovich's tripartite model of mind is particularly useful. The model divides Type 2 
processes further into algorithmic and reflective processes (Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich, 
2012; Stanovich & West, 1997).  Algorithmic-level processes refer to variations in cognitive 
abilities, that is, in optimal and maximal performance which is typically assessed with 
intelligence tests or other cognitive aptitude tests. As we do not constantly use our full 
intellectual resources and do not try to reach our highest potential in everyday life, examining 
typical reasoning is at least as important as examining maximum performance. In the 
tripartite model, typical reasoning processes are known as ‘reflective processes.’ They are 
thinking styles, or thinking dispositions, which reflect one's epistemic values and attitudes 
towards knowledge and the acquisition of information.  
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Reflective processes. Reflective processes correspond with Epsteinian-type thinking 
styles but with one essential qualification. In Stanovich’s model, both intuitive and analytical 
thinking styles are characterized as Type 2 processes, whereas in the Epsteinian approach, the 
intuitive thinking style is usually discussed together with automatic and unconscious Type 1 
processes. Stanovich's model thus makes it clear that when we ask people whether they prefer 
to rely on their intuition and trust their hunches, we are examining Type 2 epistemic styles, 
not intuitive processes per se.  Although the concepts related to epistemic styles and Type 1 
and 2 processes are often misused, most scholars, I believe, understand the difference and 
have interpreted their empirical findings properly.  
Epstein’s and Stanovich's models differ also in the number of thinking styles they deal 
with. Whereas the Epsteinian approach has examined two independent thinking styles, faith 
in intuition and need for cognition, Stanovich has focused on reflective thinking, a style close 
to need for cognition.  
Stanovich (2012) describes people with strong reflective thinking as individuals who 
collect information before making up their minds, seek various points of view before drawing 
conclusions, think extensively about problems before responding and calibrate the degree of 
strength of their opinions to the degree of evidence available. To assess reflective processes, 
Stanovich and his colleagues have developed two tests that have been used in research on 
paranormal belief, the Argument Evaluation Test (AOT, Stanovich & West, 1997) and the 
Actively Open-Minded Thinking scale (AOT, Sá, West, & Stanovich, 1999).  
AET assesses a person's ability to evaluate the objective quality of several arguments 
(e.g., Whether welfare system should be drastically cut back in size.). The test has several 
phases and the quality of the arguments has to be determined by expert judges, so only a few 
researchers have used AET in studies on paranormal beliefs. Stanovich and West (1997) 
found that those with a high reliance on argument quality displayed significantly lower scores 
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on a superstitious thinking scale than other participants. Similarly, Gray and Gallo (2016) 
found that skeptics were better than believers at evaluating the quality of the arguments 
presented. Also, in our study, those who were good at evaluating arguments believed less in 
astrology, telepathy and other paranormal phenomena than other participants (Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013). 
In studies on paranormal beliefs and analytical thinking style, the strongest associations 
have been observed for actively open-minded thinking. The AOT scale includes 41 
statements, for example 'Changing your mind is a sign of weakness' (reverse coded), 'There 
are basically two kinds of people in this world, good and bad' and 'No one can talk me out of 
something I know is right.' Overall, actively open-minded thinking indicates openness to new 
ideas, spending a great deal of time on problems before giving up, and willingness to change 
one's beliefs and to switch perspectives (Sá et al., 1999). The correlations between AOT and 
adults’ disbelief in superstitions have been as strong as approximately .50 (Sá, Kelley, Ho, & 
Stanovich, 2005; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013) and between .30 - .40 among children 
(Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2002; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2014).  
Thus it seems that actively open-minded thinking captures something essential to paranormal 
beliefs, and taps critical thinking better than the Need for Cognition scale. 
Overall, the above findings support the idea that reflective thinking hinders paranormal 
beliefs, or more generally, that Type 2 processes override intuitive judgments if an error is 
detected.  However, recall that people often know that their paranormal beliefs are irrational 
and that their superstitious rituals do not work. In other words, people can detect an error but 
choose nevertheless not to correct it - a process Risen (2016) refers to as acquiescence. These 
findings cannot be easily explained by the original process approach. As Risen has brought 
up, dual process models have an unstated assumption that when people detect an error, they 
will correct it, but the superstition and magical thinking literature evinces that this assumption 
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does not always hold. To resolve this contradiction, Risen has made an important point that 
detection and error and correction of error such be decoupled. Analyzing the processes 
underlying acquiescence in future studies can shed new explanatory light on paranormal 
beliefs.  
Algorithmic processes: intellectual abilities.  Research on the relationship between 
paranormal beliefs and algorithmic processes, more commonly known as cognitive abilities, 
has a longer history than research on thinking styles. Nevertheless, the results have been more 
contradictory than those obtained concerning reflective processes.  
To illustrate, some studies show that believers have slightly lower intelligence than 
skeptics (Hergovich & Arendasy, 2005; Killen, Wildman, & Wildman II, 1974; Sá et al., 
2005). However, other studies suggest that paranormal beliefs are not strongly related to fluid 
intelligence (Stuart-Hamilton, Nayak, & Priest, 2006), verbal intelligence (Pennycook, 
Cheyne, Seli, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2012) or memory tasks (a review: Gray & Gallo, 2016).  
Similarly, some studies indicate that believers make more probability errors than skeptics 
(Pennycook et al., 2012; Rogers, 2014),  while other studies refute these the findings 
(Blackmore, 1997; Musch & Ehrenberg, 2002). Finally, some studies show that deductive 
reasoning errors increase as paranormal beliefs increase (Lawrence & Peters, 2004; 
Wierzbicki, 1985). Again, opposite findings show that having paranormal beliefs does not 
predict failure in logical reasoning tasks (Gray & Gallo, 2016; Lesser & Marilyn, 1985).  
When considering paranormal beliefs and intellectual abilities, the Cognitive Reflection 
Test (CRT, Frederick, 2005) should also be mentioned as it is a much-used test in research on 
paranormal and religious beliefs. The CRT is a good measure of both cognitive ability and 
reflective thinking style (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011). It assesses the tendency of 
individuals to suppress an intuitive and spontaneous response and to reflect on the question 
further to find the correct response. An example is as follows: "A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in 
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total. The bat costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball cost?"  Research results 
quite consistently show that when paranormal beliefs increase, correct responses decrease 
(Bouvet & Bonnefon, 2015; Cheyne & Pennycook, 2013; Lindeman & Svedholm-Häkkinen, 
2016; Pennycook et al., 2012; but see Toplak et al., 2011). The associations have not been 
very strong, however, possibly because doing well on the test strongly depends on cognitive 
abilities.  
Algorithmic processes: cognitive inhibition. It is also possible that unintentional 
cognitive inhibition may play an important role in establishing and maintaining paranormal 
beliefs. Cognitive inhibition refers to the stopping or overriding of a mental process, for 
example suppressing unwanted or irrelevant thoughts and gating irrelevant information from 
working memory. It is like a guardian in the intuitive mind – in the jungle where a variety of 
cognitive processes and competences are likely at any moment to collide, clash, and compete 
(Houdé, 2000; Kipp Harnishfeger, 1995). Cognitive inhibition is one of the main features of 
executive functions, the key computational function of the algorithmic mind (Stanovich, 
2009).  
Although cognitive inhibition has received little research attention in the field of 
paranormal beliefs, it is noteworthy how similar the correlates of paranormal beliefs are to 
the correlates of decreased cognitive inhibition. Like paranormal beliefs, weak cognitive 
inhibition is associated with anxiety and neuroticism (a review: Nigg, 2000), feelings of 
threat (Linville, 1996), loose associations (White & Shah, 2006), and intuitive thinking 
(Moutier & Houdé, 2003). Moreover, severe breakdowns in cognitive inhibition occur in 
diseases that are also associated with supernatural beliefs, for example in schizophrenia 
(Nigg, 2000).  
Although empirical evidence is limited, some studies suggest that believers in the 
supernatural have weaker cognitive inhibition than disbelievers. First, paranormal believers 
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have performed poorer than skeptics on each subscale of the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, 
including perseverative errors (Lindeman, Riekki, & Hood, 2011), the subscale most often 
connected with inhibitory problems. In addition, an fMRI study showed that when 
participants were viewing pictures inducing supernatural explanations for the stories they had 
read, brain regions indicating cognitive inhibition were activated more strongly in skeptics 
than in supernatural believers (Lindeman, Svedholm, Riekki, Raij, & Hari, 2013).  
Summary  
 The main findings from the two dual process approaches can now be summarized as 
follows. The results concerning cognitive abilities are the most equivocal. On the one hand, if 
differences in intellectual abilities exist, the direction is usually the same in that believers 
show lower cognitive competence than disbelievers. On the other, the difference is small. 
Moreover, decreased unintentional cognitive inhibition can also predict paranormal beliefs, 
but the evidence is still preliminary.  
Results on variations in Type 2 reflective processes are more robust: compared with 
skeptics, the thinking style of paranormal believers is more intuitive and less analytical. 
Although the association between beliefs and analytical thinking style has sometimes been 
weak, the tendency of believers to score low on the AOT has been exceptionally strong, 
implying believers' epistemological absolutism, cognitive rigidity, dogmatism, categorical 
thinking and resistance to belief change. However, only a few studies on paranormal beliefs 
have used the AOT, so future studies are needed to confirm the findings.  
Caveats and Questions 
Most of the above-cited results were based on bivariate correlations or comparisons 
between believer and skeptic groups. These results can give false impressions, for example 
that paranormal beliefs increase linearly with increasing Faith in Intuition and decreasing 
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Need for Cognition, Actively Open-minded Thinking and correct Cognitive Reflection Test 
responses. That is not necessarily the case, however.  
First, all believers may not be intuitive thinkers and all skeptics may not be analytical 
thinkers. As among religious believers and non-believers (Lindeman & Lipsanen, 2016), as 
well as among religious, paranormal and spiritual believers (Schofield, Baker, Staples, & 
Sheffield, 2016), there might be different subgroups which cannot be detected with variable-
centered analyses such as correlations and analyses of variance. One study has indeed 
revealed such unexpected groups as analytically thinking paranormal believers and skeptics 
who trust their intuitions (Napola, 2015). In this study, the majority of skeptics (84%) had 
higher need for cognition than faith in intuition, but 16% of them had the opposite. Of 
believers, in turn, 56% had higher faith in intuition than need for cognition, 30% had higher 
need for cognition than faith in intuition, and among 14% of the participants, need for 
cognition and faith in intuition were both high. Although the previously found trend 
concerning beliefs and thinking styles was hence primarily confirmed, the results remind us 
of the possibility that believers and skeptics are not homogenous groups but can represent 
subgroups which differ in their cognitive characteristics. This is plausible as many other 
factors affect paranormal beliefs, such as education, social environment, and personality. 
Second, it would be important to know whether the various thinking styles are 
independent from each other or whether they overlap, and, if they do, which of the methods 
predict paranormal beliefs best. To address this question, I analyzed the contributions of Faith 
in Intuition, Need for Cognition, Actively Open-minded Thinking and correct CRT 
responses, by performing a regression analysis of our data (N = 2789 Finnish individuals (for 
more details about the data, see Lindeman, Svedholm-Häkkinen, & Lipsanen, 2015). The 
results showed that after controlling for age and sex, high faith in intuition was by far the 
strongest predictor of the beliefs (β = .37, p < .001). Actively open-minded thinking (β = -.18, 
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p < .001) and correct CRT responses (β = -.08, p < .001) also made a unique contribution to 
the beliefs. The only variable which had no relationship with the beliefs was need for 
cognition (β = -.01, ns). In other words, Faith in Intuition, Actively Open-minded Thinking, 
and CRT performance all had independent effects on paranormal beliefs when the effects of 
the other thinking styles were eliminated. Although the results may imply that Need for 
Cognition is covered by the other scales, it is important to remember that such results are 
often unstable and depend heavily on the data.  
The above results may highlight the possibility that Actively Open-minded Thinking, 
the reflective processes measured by CRT, and Need for Cognition are lower-level constructs 
that underlie a more general master rationality motive (MRM). MRM is a concept coined by 
(Stanovich, 2008; Stanovich, 2011). It is a high-level control motivational state that resides in 
the reflective mind and drives the search for the cognitive critique of our beliefs and for the 
rational integration of inconsistent and incompatible beliefs and desires. Persons with a 
strong MRM want their beliefs to be true, want to act in accordance with reason, and find a 
lack of rational integration aversive. Because MRM is proposed to be a more general 
cognitive disposition than actively open-minded thinking and related thinking styles, it is 
probable that people who are skeptical about paranormal beliefs will score high on the scale. 
So far, however, the scale has not been used in studies on paranormal beliefs. 
Bringing all of the above-described results and arguments together, it is safe to 
conclude that strong intuitive thinking style and low analytical thinking style predict 
paranormal (supernatural, magical, superstitious) beliefs, and that both intuitive and 
analytical thinking styles make independent contributions to these beliefs. These findings 
raise one central questions: are intuitive and analytical thinking sufficient to explain 
paranormal beliefs? For example, how do the findings on paranormal believers' strong 
intuitive thinking fit with the fact that intuitions can also produce ingenious works? Michael 
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S. Brown, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in medicine in 1985, has said that his research 
group went from one step to the next, and that somehow they knew which was the right way 
to go. "And I can't really tell you how we knew that" (cited in Claxton, 2006). Einstein said 
the same thing: "Words and language, whether written or spoken, do not seem to play any 
part in my thought processes" (Hadamard, 1954, p. 142). Of course, scientific thinking 
proceeds from intuitions to reflective thinking and verbalizable arguments because intuitive 
thinking in scientific work means a stage of thinking, not a permanent thinking style. 
Nonetheless, the intuitive thinking style influences a host of affairs, ranging from job type to 
food choice in everyday life (e.g., Akinci & Sadler‐Smith, 2013; Ares, Mawad, Giménez, & 
Maiche, 2014). In other words, intuitive and analytical thinking styles can apply to all 
thought, irrespective of its content, and yet it is their peculiar content that sets paranormal 
beliefs apart from other unfounded beliefs. In our studies, we have explored the possibility 
that core knowledge confusions underlie all paranormal beliefs, and that it is these intuitive 
confusions that intuitive thinkers count on whereas analytical thinkers do not.  
Paranormal Beliefs and Core Knowledge Confusions 
The term ‘core knowledge’ refers to knowledge about evolutionarily important entities 
and processes in the world. It is knowledge that children universally learn, almost without 
explicit instruction and irrespective of culture, roughly at the same age early in life (Carey, 
1985; Spelke & Kinzler, 2007; Wellman & Gelman, 1998).  
Although the exact nature of core knowledge remains to be determined, increasing 
evidence suggests that what is critical when considering paranormal beliefs are the main 
properties that differentiate the mental from the physical – and within the physical domain, 
animate from inanimate, and living from lifeless. The differences can be summarized as 
follows. Physical phenomena are material and objective but mental phenomena (beliefs, 
desires and emotions) are subjective and immaterial. Animate beings can commit intentional, 
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purposeful acts, but inanimate entities cannot. Physical objects have an independent existence 
in space, while mental states do not, and they can move other objects by physical force 
whereas mental states also cannot.  Living organisms grow and die, lifeless ones do not. And 
finally, access to the physical world is necessary for perception, which informs beliefs and 
knowledge, but desires and emotions can arise mentally without biological senses.  
The vast majority of core knowledge develops by preschool age, but the differences 
between the domains are not at once entirely clear. Jean Piaget was among the first to 
demonstrate the varieties of mental-physical confusions among children. For example, when 
he interviewed a 7-year-old girl about the nature of a thought, the girl explained that a 
thought is in the head, it is white and round, and that one cannot see it because it is too far 
back in the mouth (Piaget, 1929/1951).  
Our own research on paranormal beliefs has been inspired by how analogous children's 
confusions are to those found in adults' paranormal beliefs. A few examples which illustrate 
the similarity are given below. 
 
Children: Children do not appreciate that biological senses, such as vision and hearing, 
are necessary conditions for informational access, but see knowledge as arising purely 
mentally within the individual, like desires (Wimmer, Hogrefe, & Perner, 1988). For 
example, young children might believe that a person can know which toy is hidden in a 
container although the person has never seen the toy (Pillow & Weed, 1997).  
Adults: Belief in telepathy, clairvoyance, and precognition. 
 
Children: Developing understanding of intentional behavior and the human 
manufacture of artifacts induce small children to see all kinds of things in terms of 
purpose and intentional design. They may think that mountains are made for climbing, 
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that clouds are for raining and the sun is for warmth (Kelemen, 1999; Piaget, 
1929/1951).  
Adults: Belief in creationism and the purpose of events. 
 
Children: As long as knowledge of biological processes as the prerequisites of life is 
undeveloped, understanding the finality of death is not possible (Carey, 1985). 
Although young children may understand that the dead cannot eat or drink, they tend to 
believe that psychological states, especially beliefs, emotions and desires, can continue 
after death (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004).  
Adults: Belief in an afterlife. 
 
Children: Young children have difficulties in understanding the representational nature 
of symbols, and tend to equate symbolic contents with the objects they represent. In 
(Piaget, 1929/1951) interviews, many children thought that the sun had always had its 
name, that the name of the sun was in the sun, and that we could see the name if we 
looked at the sun. The responses reveal that the children had not yet grasped the idea 
that symbols have no realistic connection to their referents any more than saying the 
word 'rain' can cause it to actually rain. 
Adults: Belief in tarot cards and astrology. 
 
Children: Before the mental-physical distinction is fully developed, children tend to 
believe that reality can be modified by thoughts and desires. In Vikan and Clausen's 
(1993) study, almost all 4–6-year-olds believed that a child who is in school could 
influence her mother at home only by making a wish. In another study, 3-year-olds 
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believed that an object could appear inside a box if they first thought about the object 
(Woolley & Wellman, 1993) 
Adults: Belief in psychokinesis and telekinesis, i.e., the capacity of thoughts to 
influence physical objects.  
 
In the above examples, children and adults make category mistakes: they borrow 
properties of one category (e.g., physical objects) to characterize an entity in another 
ontological category (e.g., mental phenomena). Category mistakes are different from ordinate 
mistakes. If we say that a dog is ill, although it is not, we are making an ordinate mistake. If 
we say that a dog is an hour long, we are making a category mistake because dogs are not 
measured by hours but by height and weight. Similarly, if we think that the planet Venus has 
electromagnetic effects on the Earth, we are making an ordinate mistake. If we think that the 
symbolic attributes of harmony and solidarity, which astrologers have assigned to Venus, 
influence the Earth, we are making a category mistake. 
We have earlier demonstrated that paranormal, superstitious, magical and supernatural 
beliefs can be best defined as core knowledge confusions (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). 
This definition has many advantages. It can integrate several constructs that have been used 
in separate lines of research into beliefs (e.g., animism, anthropomorphism, promiscuous 
teleological reasoning, spirituality, and mind-body dualism). The definition also helps us to 
outline which beliefs should be categorized as paranormal and which should not. For 
example, belief in graphology may be unfounded, but it is not superstitious because it does 
not include any category mistakes (for details, see Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012).  
Ontological violations in supernatural beliefs are also discussed in the field of cognitive 
science of religion. The main tenet is that religious concepts violate a few but never many 
ontological assumptions about persons, animals, plants, artifacts, or natural, non-living 
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objects. Thus, an admiring horse or a flying cow is a supernatural concept but a chattering 
climbing pig is not (Atran & Norenzayan, 2005; Upala, Gonce, Tweney, & Slone, 2007). We, 
in contrast, have suggested that mixing the core attributes of the higher-order categories of 
mental and physical, animate and inanimate, and living and lifeless, rather than the number of 
violations, is essential. Hence, according to our framework, none of those examples are good 
examples of supernatural beliefs because the ability to differentiate between flying and non-
flying animals, or animate beings with complex emotions and animate beings without, is not 
core knowledge. Moreover, I would argue that the reason why people find it easy to 
differentiate supernatural beliefs from other unfounded beliefs, is expressly the mix-up of the 
basic properties of mental and physical, animate and inanimate, and living and lifeless. That 
is why an incorporeal spirit feels more descriptive of the supernatural than a flying cow.  
Much evidence shows that people who believe in paranormal phenomena make more 
ontological mistakes in core knowledge than do skeptics (Barber, 2014; Lindeman & Aarnio, 
2007; Lindeman, Blomqvist, & Takada, 2012; Lindeman et al., 2008; Lobato et al., 2014; 
Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2015; Svedholm, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 
2010). Most of these studies have used a sentence rating task.  In this task, participants are 
presented with statements which mix the core attributes of lifeless and living (e.g., 'Stars live 
in the sky'), lifeless and animate (e.g., 'Earth wants water'), inanimate and animate organisms 
(e.g., 'The house knows its history'), as well as mental phenomena and physical objects (e.g., 
'Grief moves in the stomach').  
That core knowledge confusions in particular are typical of believers is implied by 
findings showing that believers rate these sentences as more literally true than skeptics do. 
However, believers do not differ from skeptics when rating the literal truth of clearly literal 
sentences (e.g., “Mozart was a composer”) or clearly metaphorical ones (e.g., “The surprising 
piece of news is a bomb”). We have also found, as might be expected, that analytical thinkers 
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have less ontological confusions than intuitive thinkers (Lindeman, 2011; Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2007; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). Furthermore, confusions between mental and 
non-mental phenomena have even been observed in perceptual processes: more so than 
skeptics, paranormal believers detect illusory agents and illusory faces (Van Elk, 2013; 
Riekki, Lindeman, Aleneff, Halme, & Nuortimo, 2013), and attribute intentions to random 
movement (Riekki, Lindeman, & Raij, 2014).  
An intriguing possibility is that ontological violations are side-effects of human mental 
design, and that they remain their autonomous power from childhood throughout life and 
explain supernatural beliefs among adults. This is what several scholars in cognitive science 
of religion have suggested (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Bering, 2006; Guthrie, 1993; Hood, 2009; 
Kelemen, 2004). For example, according to Guthrie (1993), seeing intentional agents is an 
evolutionarily based, involuntary, mostly unconscious process which produces false 
positives: because detecting intentional agents has been adaptive in our evolutionary past, 
people may notice intentional beings even in inanimate nature. In the same way, there are no 
false negatives in non-religious paranormal beliefs, only false positives: thoughts are assumed 
to be over-powerful, and the mind over-sovereign, for example. Thus, universal cognitive 
architecture may be responsible for the existence of paranormal beliefs whereas culture is 
responsible for the specific forms the beliefs might take. 
At first sight, the fact that millions of people all over the world do not believe in the 
supernatural seems to challenge the above argument. And we have already seen that 
disbelievers do not endorse ontological confusions but take them metaphorically. However, 
most of the studies concerned were based on self-reports, and they leave open the possibility 
that implicit ontological confusions can also be endorsed implicitly.  
We recall that skeptics may, in general, have stronger cognitive inhibition than 
believers. Inhibition can also be temporarily compromised by asking study participants to 
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respond very quickly. Speeded responding increases cognitive load and causes inhibitory 
failures, making judgements more reﬂective of intuitive processes. Preliminary evidence does 
indeed suggest that when forced to think intuitively, ontological confusions can be found not 
only among paranormal believers but among other people as well.  
Kelemen and her colleagues (Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Kelemen, Rottman, & Seston, 
2013) have conducted several experimental studies on the role of inhibition in endorsing 
unwarranted intentional explanations. They showed that, if asked to respond quickly, 
university students and even physical scientists explain natural phenomena, such as sunlight, 
by reference to a purpose and design in nature. In our study, the number of ontological 
confusions increased across all participants when asked to respond quickly as well (Svedholm 
& Lindeman, 2013). Importantly, the confusions lost their relationship to paranormal beliefs 
under speeded responding, which possibly indicates that even individuals who do not believe 
in paranormal phenomena make similar confusions under demanding conditions. It may thus 
be the case that ontological confusions can be implicit, and that consequently they are most 
discernible when thinking is dominated by intuitive processing.  
Why People Believe 
As a summary, we can now delineate an overall, albeit tentative, view of intuition and 
reason in the formation and maintenance of paranormal beliefs.  
Paranormal beliefs are best understood as culturally and historically variable beliefs 
that are based on ontological confusions of core knowledge about physical, psychological and 
biological phenomena. These confusions are typical of the early phases of children's 
cognitive development, and it is possible, although not yet rigorously proven, that the 
misconceptions do not disappear when growing up. In adulthood, the confusions can be 
unintentionally inhibited, or they can suddenly come to mind as intuitions that can either be 
trusted or intentionally rejected as irrelevant. 
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Particularly individuals with an intuitive thinking style tend to consider ontologically 
impossible phenomena to be feasible, making the adoption of culturally available 
supernatural ideas possible. Belief in ghosts and other spirits is possible only if one accepts, 
in one way or another, that a mind can live without a biological body. The intuitive thinking 
style also entails a broad spectrum of heuristics and biases which further make culturally 
prevailing paranormal conceptions easy to digest. Associative and experiential thought 
processes can predispose an individual to assume that the co-occurrence of a full moon and a 
strange experience reflects causation, or that one's personal experience of a flash of light, and 
the interpretation associated with it, proves the existence of angels.  
Concurrently with ontological confusions and paranormal beliefs, intuitive thinkers 
may have rational and well-founded knowledge about the same things. Conflicting beliefs 
can be held in parallel because they are processed differently, one more analytically and the 
other more unconsciously. That intuition speaks in favor of the supernatural although reason 
can find no rational foundations for the beliefs is sometimes frankly admitted. As a Finnish 
vicar has said: "I allow myself a belief in the virgin birth and I understand that according to 
modern biology it is impossible."  
Some people, in turn, try to explain the conflict away. However, it is easier to believe in 
astrology than to convincingly explain how it works, and it is easier to believe in God than to 
justify his existence.  The conflict breeds foggy metaphors and ambiguous rationalizations: 
we try to explain verbally something which cannot be verbalized. This sits well with Epstein 
and Pacini's (1999), Stanovich's (2004) and Evans's view that confabulation is one of the 
functions of the reflective mind: "We make up stories to maintain the illusion that we are the 
chief executive who is really in control" (Evans, 2010, p.6).  
Although intuitions are compelling as well as resistant to change, and deep-rooted 
culturally shared supernatural beliefs can be difficult to resist, they both can be abandoned 
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after critical evaluation. Cognitive abilities may be one underlying factor, but an analytical 
thinking style is more important. A critical attitude towards ontological confusions and the 
supernatural is particularly characteristic of individuals who prefer actively open-minded 
thinking, that is, who aim at flexible and objective reasoning and who avoid absolutism, 
dichotomies and dogmatism. 
Analytical thinkers are also able to avoid general cognitive biases. Among other things, 
they are better at detecting conflicts, for example between reality and supernatural beliefs 
(Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2014).  Furthermore, for analytical 
thinkers, the personal experience of a psychic's ability to accurately predict a specific event 
does not suffice: clairvoyance cannot be rationally explained, and psychics have so far not 
managed to demonstrate their abilities under objective conditions. Because reflective thinkers 
seek various points of view before making a conclusion, they have also noticed, for instance, 
what was wrong when astrologers claimed that the murder of Swedish politician Anna Lindh 
in 2003 could be forecasted from her astrological chart. All of the forecasts were given after 
the murder.   
To conclude, I quote the philosopher Bertrand Russell (1921/1949, p. 231) who wrote 
that belief is the central problem in the analysis of mind: "Believing seems the most mental 
thing we do...The whole intellectual life consists of beliefs, and of the passages from one 
belief to another." By carefully scrutinizing what we believe and why, not only may critical 
thinking increase, but eternal questions such as "what is the purpose of life" might also be 
approached from a new point of view. That is, not as a difficult question to which the correct 
answer is hard to find, but as a question that is wrongly posed. 
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